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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JACK F. SCHERBEL,
ERIFF OF RESPONDENT
Plaintiff~AppelIant,
Case No. 19633
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
et al.,
Defendant-Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This case presents the following issues:
1.

May this Court seriously entertain appellant-Scherbel's

Statement of Facts when:

(a) there are no references to the

official record, and (b) there are significant inaccuracites,
mischaracterizations and significant omissions?
2.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it

applied Western Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388
(1980) to preclude appellant-Scherbelfs assertion of vested
rights to avoid the application of new City zoning changes?
3.

Does the record support the trial court's findings that

appellant-Scherbel:
(a)

Knew his property was in an historic district,-,

reauiring design review under a strict scrutiny test;
(b)

Knew of a movement to submit to the City a

petition for a change in zoning in the subject area to more

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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restrictive terms ("R-2H") was pending and chances of its
success were high;
(c)

Presented a development plan which included a

critical parcel of ground which appellant-Scherbel did not
own nor control;
(d)

Proposed at least 3 plans, each of which failed to

conform to the prior existing "F-6" zoning, let alone the
more restrictive "R-~2Hn zoninq;
(e)

Proposed plans which were visually incompatible in

the Avenues Historic District (by the City Council).
4.

Does the record support the trial court's finding that,

prior to the adoption of the new ffR-2H" zoning provisions,
appellant-Scherbel had not substantially complied with the then
existing "R-6" zoning provisions; and that therefore, Scherbel
was not unlawfully denied a building permit by the City?
5.

Did the Court commit prejudicial error when it ruled

that the Greater Avenues Community Council ("GACC") had standing
to challenge a decision on Historical Design Compatability Review
required under City law?
6. Did the lower court commit prejudicial error when it
ruled that the City Council could hear appeals on Design Review
from the City's Planninq Commission, when said procedure was
established under City law and with the concurrence of the Mayor?
7.

Was the City Council's decision arbitrary or capricious

when it denied appellant-Scherbel's appeal from the Planninq
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Commission's Design Review decision?
DETEPMINATIVE LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
REQUIRING INTERPRETATION
Chapter 32 of Title 51 of Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CAPE
In this zoning case, plaintiff-appellant, Jack F. Scherbel,
sought to build an income producing structure in the Avenues
Historic District.

A modified design was approved, but

appellant-Scherbel claims he had vested rights to a larger
development.

Similarly, Scherbel desires to have the City

Council's decision finding his project visually incompatible in
the Historic District invalidated for alleged procedural
improprieties.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On February 25, 1980, appellant-Scherbel obtained a
restraining order barring defendant-respondent, Salt Lake City
Corporation from proceeding with the publication of two
ordinances scheduled to run February 26, 1980. One of the
ordinances established a new district, the Residential n R-2 n
District.

The second changed the then existing Residential "R-6"

to the lower density, more restrictive Residential "R-2H11
classification, for a large area known as the East Avenues area
of the City.

That order was dissolved and the reauest for

injunctive relief denied by Court Order on or about March 24,
1980.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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After a bench trial, the lower court dismissed Scherbel's
complaint for extraordinary relief.

A copy of said Judgment is

attached with a copy of the Second Amended Findings of ^acts as •
Appendix Exhibit 1 and 2.
The lower court dismissed Scherbel's complaint concludinq:
(1) The decision of the City Council denying conceptual
approval of Scherbel's proposed project1 by the City's Planninq
Commission was affirmed; the Court ruled it was not arbitrary
and did it exceed the City Council's authority.
(2) The development standards of the City's Historic
District Design Review System are constitutional;
(3) The "R-2H" zoning provisions are constitutional.

These

ordinance provisions include an appeal right from the Plannina
Commission to the City Council.
(4) The legislative act of downzoning land to

,f

R-2H" was

not invalid.
(5) Scherbel was not entitled to a buildinq permit and has

Scherbel submitted to the City various plans for the property at
different times suggesting four different buildings designs. The
distinctions are most easily described in terms of heioht and
number of units, as follows: (a) Exhibit 37P submitted to HLC
10/24/81 is for 35 units at 75 feet in height. (b) Exhibit 38P
were updated concepts reflected in Exhibit 39, which was prepared
for the appeal to the Plannina Commission showinq 32 units 65
feet in height (R 358, 421-22, 429). (c) Exhibit 43 shows 24
units. (d) Exhibit 43 is alternate plan for 18 units.
2

The comparative profiles of the structure in both 37P (35 units)
to 39P (32 units) is illustrated well on Exhibits 55 and 56 which
are attached as Exhibits 3 and 4 to the Appendix.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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no vested r i g h t s for any of h i s proposed p r o j e c t s .
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The City as on appeal seeks an order from the Supreme Court
affirming the judgment of the Lov/er Court and awarding its costs
and fees herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

K

Because the complicated chronology of this case, the trial
court (after more than one hearing) entered detailed Findings of
Facts.

Those Findings are attached as Appendix, Exhibit 2.

However, because of the numerous inaccuracies in the allegations
made in the appellant-Scherbel's brief and its failure to cite
the record, The City believes it should be stricken.

A few of

the errors shall be noted.
1.

Contrary to the appellant's brief, Scherbel was not the

owner of property on the southeast corner of "E" Street and
Second Avenue.

This parcel, while included in the project, was

owned by a Mr. Bennett.

As of trial, there had been no written

agreement, merely an agreement to agree (R 248).

There had been

no disclosure of that fact by appellant-Scherbel at the time the
projects were submitted to the City for review.
Mark Hafey; R 532-534).

(Testimony of

Of the other three parcels, there is no

testimony cited in the record on appeal that can substantiate the

See footnote 1 above.
See Finding No. 2.
-5-
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individualized history of each parcel proffered by Mr.
Scherbel.

Mr. Scherbel and Mr. Bennett testified at trial, but

their testimony was not ordered by the appellant and is thus, not
before this Court for appropriate reference by appellant or
rebuttal by the City.
2.

In addition, as to the statements relatinq to attempts

of Scherbel to develop portions of the property controlled by
himself or his family, Scherbel cites to Exhibits "D 28-32" which
were documents rejected by the trial judge (R 229).

They are not

properly before this Court; however, appellant-Scherbel having
raised the issue, a more relevant fact should be noted:

there

were several proposals by appellant-Scherbel in the 3 vears
between 1973 and 1976 (R 229). They demonstrated a pattern of
speculative proposals that each reauired a City zoning variance
or action by the City's Board of Adjustment; each of these plans
came to naught, without action by the City.

(D Ex. 28, 29, 30,

31, 32).
3.

Scherbel has understandably but inaccurately taken a

broad brush approach to the chronology of events. The accurate
chronology is detailed in Findings No. 4-40 (R 355-362).

A

highlight of the dynamic factors are Fact Nos. 4-39, below.
4.

5

As part of its process for developing an updated master

(R 224)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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plan for the Avenues Community,

in 19 75 the City undertook

identification of citizen goals and objectives for the
Avenues.

Goals identified, in that process included (a) the

establishment of historical districts; (b) changesdn zoning to
lower densities', to discourage speculation, encouraae
preservation and new compatible development; and (c) protection
of the foothills.
GACC.

Participants of that process included the

Following the development of the Master Plan, GACC has

been active in seeking the legislative changes needed to address
and implement those goals.
5.

(R 245).

The Greater Avenues Community Council is a non-profit

corporation of the State of Utah,

Its declared purpose is to

promote the general well being of the residents of the Avenues
area of Salt Lake City.

Its members are appointed or elected

residents of the Avenues.
292).

(R 245 -% Articles and Bylaws R 284-

One of its purposes is to affiliate with the Salt Lake

Association of Community Councils (R 287).
6.

In April of 1976, Salt Lake City Corporation established

an Historical District and Landmark's Sites ordinance for the
South Temple District.

(Section 51-32-1, et seq., Revised

Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, as amended).

A second

district for the Avenues, initiated in 1977, became formally

A community within the City identified as the area existing
north of North Temple and south of Capitol Hill.
'Avenues Goals and Policy Report, Exhibits 48 D and 49 D (R 229).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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established in 1978.

Anpellant-Scherbel's property lies within

the boundaries of the Avenues Historic District subject of these
ordinances.
7.

(R 245, 355-6).

Pursuant to Chapter 3 2 of the ahove referenced City

ordinances, all proposals for demolition or construction within
an Historical District must include an apnlication for design
review and are to be evaluated by the Historical Landmarks
Committee, ("HLC") for visual compatibility with existino*
structures, in light of established development standards.

HLC's

decision is forwarded as a recommendation to the City's Planning
Commission.

The Planning Commission then evaluates the

application in light of HLC's recommendation.

Usually it is

given approval as a consent matter, unless an appeal is filed.
If an appeal is filed with the Commission, it undertakes its own
review and either denies or grants conceptual approval of the
schematic design.

If conceptual approval is granted by the

Commission, the proposed project is then processed by City
administrative departments in the same manner as all other
projects, once working drawings and an application for a buildina
o

permit

are filed.

That is, the City then reviews the documents

to determine whether the project meets design approval and

In the form of Exhibit 41D required by Sections 301 and 302 of
the Uniform Building Code, Exhibit 93D as adopted by Section 517-2 of City's ordinances, Exhibit 92D, and the provisions of
Chapter 5 of Title 5, Exhibit 91A, and Section 51-4-4, Exhibit
90D.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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complies with other City zoning ordinances and building code
Q

requirements.

.

Unless an affected party disagrees with the

Planning Commission decision and timely appeals to the City
Council, the Planning Commission's decision is final.
524, 537-547).
8.

I

(R 512,

i

Plaintiff was acauainted with the design review process

of the historic district, after submitting to HLC an application
in July of 1977 for desiqn review to construct a convalescent
center on his property.
9.

(R 356, 434).

In November of 1978, following on the heels of a citizen

initiated and GACC supported petitioit to change the zoning of the
West Avenues area (West of

,f

E* Street), property owners and

t,?

residents of the East Central^Avenues publicly began a project to
downzone the eastern portion of the Avenues.
10.

(R 356).

The aforesaid rezoning project requested downzoning; it

also sought the creation of a new residential district.

These

:

legislative initiatives sought to preserve the unique historical
character of the lower East-Central Avenues and to protect

-

The building official is prohibited from issuing buildinq
permits, until compliance with zoning codes is ascertained as
required by Section 51-4-2, (Exhibit 90D), 51-32-4, and the
Planning Commission is prohibited in Section 51-32-7 from
:
granting approval beyond concept unless the proposal meets all
other requirements for "issuance of such a permit". (R 537-547).
Section 51-32-11, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,
Exhibit 25P.
11

HLC Case No. 24 of 1977, Exhibit 33D
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a g a i n s t speculation pressures for incompatible development.
11.

The change of the zoning was discussed with the C i t y ' s

Planning Department in January of 19 79.

I t was formally

presented t o HLC in March of 1979 and reduced to formal written
p r o p o s a l , with supporting s i g n a t u r e s to the City on July 5, 1979
as P e t i t i o n No. 579 of 1979.
12.

(R 356).

After reviewing the p e t i t i o n on i t s own, on September

13, 1979, the Commission scheduled an informal p u b l i c hearing for
October 1 1 , 1979; however, due to c o n f l i c t s the meeting was
rescheduled to October 25, 1979.
13.

(R 357).

Appellant-Scherbel became aware of the downzoninq

p r o j e c t for the East-Central Avenues a t or about January, 1979,
when t h e West Avenues were downzoned.
14.

(R 433A).

Mr. Babcock, a p p e l l a n t - S c h e r b e l ' s a r c h i t e c t had been

involved with a p r o j e c t in the Avenues H i s t o r i c a l D i s t r i c t and
was aware of the e f f o r t s and o b j e c t i v e s to proceed with
downzoning the Avenues.
15.

(R 438, 433A, 431).

In Spring of 1979 (when appellant-Scherbel employed

architect-Babcock to design a condominium p r o j e c t allowable under
maximum

lf

R-6" zoning p o t e n t i a l ) , both were aware of pending

proposals to secure downzoning of the East-Central Avenues, which
would include Mr. S c h e r b e l ' s property.

(R 410, 433, 433A, 356,

438).
16.

In August of 1979, architect-Babcock

informally

contacted HLC's chairperson to identify and a n t i c i p a t e possible
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
- 1 0OCR,
- may contain errors.

HLC concerns for such a project.
zoning changes were discussed.
17.

Among other things, the pending
(R 416, 356).

After a preliminary informal meeting with PLC's

architectural subcommittee on September"14, 1979, on October 24,
1979 Mr. Babcock prepared and appellant-Scherbel submitted to the
City partial schematic or conceptual drawings of a 35-unit
multiple family dwelling 75' high with an application form signed
by the plaintiff, as owner of the property within the proposed
project.
18.

(R 444-6; Exhibit 2P, R 357).
The "design review" is the initial preliminary stage

where concepts are reflected on partial schematic drawings; they
are submitted to minimize unnecessary expense, work and delay to
the property owner.

These designs are the forerunner, but are

not a substitute for subsequent working drawings which must be
prepared prior to a developers application for and the City's
issuance of a building permit.
19.

(R 447-450, 538-544, 489-494).. ;.

The Planning Commission conducted the hearing on the

above described rezoning petition for the Avenues, which
appellant-Scherbel attended.

On November 8, it formally

recommended forwarding the Commission's approval of the
downzoning petition and adoption of a "R-2H" district for the
area.

On November 21, 1979, the recommendation was referred to

the then City Commission.12

(R 357).

,z

ln May of 1979, City residents voted to change an optional
Mayor-Council form of government. The Council members and Mayor
(footnote continued)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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20.

HLC first considered plaintiff's drawings on November

6, 1979. On December 4, 1979, after negative recommendation from
its architectural subcommittee, HLC determined the proposed 75'
high 35-unit project

was not visually compatible with the

buildings to which it was visually related in the district.
Denial was due to violation of the development standards
pertaining to height and scale, sometimes called "density" or
"mass".

(R 358, 420).

21.

On December 6, 1979, plaintiff appealed the adverse

recommendation of HLC to the Planning Commission.

This hearing

was scheduled on December 13, 1979 for hearing on January 10,
1980.

(R 358).
22.

In anticipation of the appeal hearing before the

Planning Commission, architect-Babcock prepared preliminary
drawings for appellant-Scherbel's second project, a 65' high 32unit building.
23.

(R 358, Exhibit 38).

This second design concept in Exhibit 38P was revised

prior to the hearing; on January 10, 1980 it was presented in the
amended form of a 32-unit project (Exhibit 39P). These schematic
and partial drawings for the 32-unit project were presented
directly to the Planning Commission, without HLC review.

This

latest project was given design compatibility concept approval by

were elected in early November of 1979. The Mayor was the only
person elected to continue in office. (R 358).
13

Exhibit 37P.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the'--'Commission.
24.

(R 475, 358).

On January 11, 1980f GACC appealed the decision of the

Planning Commission to the Mayor, an option provided by City
Ordinance Section 51-32-11, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
Utah, 1965, as amended.
25.

(R 359)*

Early in January, 1980, the City Council advertised the

hearing to consider rezoning proposals of petition 579 for
January 29, 1980.

(R 109). The hearinq was continued to January

31, 1980, after which the Council gave conceptual approval and
reauested the ordinance be prepared in appropriate legislative
form.

(R 359).
26." The legislation was prepared and passed on February 19,

1980.

It was scheduled for publication on February 26, 1980.

(R

104-114).
27.

On January 29, 1980, the Salt Lake City Attorney's

office provided Mayor Ted Wilson and the City Council, with an
opinion letter regarding the procedure for hearing GACC's
appeal.
28.

(R 359).

—

.

On February 4, 1980, the City Council gave notice to

the Appellant-Scherbel that it would hear the GACC appeal of the
Planning Commission decision on the HLC case February 19, 1980.
(R 359).
29.

On February 5, 1980, architect-Pabcock presented his ,

second 32-unit project of Exhibit 39 (approved by the Planning
Commission) to HLC, which found it to be incompatible for the
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same problems associated with the original 35-unit project.
(R 359; cf. Statement of Fact No. 20, above).
30.

On February 19, 1980, the Mayor issued Executive Order

No. 2, which designated the City Council as the proper body to
hear the appeal.14

(R 359; cf. Statement of Fact Nos. 24 and 27,

above).
31.

On February 19 and 20, 1980, the City Council conducted

the hearing to consider the conceptual design of plaintiff's
second 32-unit 65' high project, as presented in Exhibit 39.

(R

359).
32.

At the conclusion of the public hearing and its

deliberations, the City Council reversed the decision of the
Planning Commission.

It found that the design concepts were

visually incompatible and contrary to development standards. The
Council denied conceptual approval of Appellant-Scherbel's
proposed project as reflected in Exhibit 39.
33.

(R 360).

On February 25, 1980, appellant-Scherbel filed suit and

temporarily enjoined scheduled publication of the nR-2H" and
rezoninq ordinances.
34.

(R 361).

On March 3, 1980, Mr. Scherbel filed another

application with HLC, known as Case 190, which schematically
proposed a third project 42' high, with 18 units on two of the
four original parcels.

(R 361, 2 ) .

4

Exhibit 12P.
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35.

^his application was heard by HLC on March 4, 1980 and

referred to its subcommittee.

This third project, together with

a fourth 24-unit alternative, was prepared and considered by the
HLC committee on March 17, 1980.
abandoned when the

It was later

,f

R-2H" and rezpning ordinances became

effective March 28, 1980.
36.

(Exhibit 43 P).

(R 361).

w

A subsequent review of all conceptual drawings was

conducted on each of the four projects introduced by appellantScherbel; to~wit:

#1, Exhibit 37P, being 75 feet hiqh with 35

units and amenities; #2, Exhibit 39P, being 65 feet high with 32
units and amenities; #3, Exhibit 43P, being about 42 feet high .
with 18 units and less amenities; and #4, an alternative to #3
above, with 24 units and amenities.

A review of each proposed

project reveals that each failed to comply with City, design
criteria; these delects include the following: ^;
a.

Defined features violated various minimum zoning

requirements then existing in the "R-6" district;
b » I t could not Qualify for zoning approval, until and
unless, variances were obtained from the Board of
Adjustment—if possible—regardless of design approval; and
c.

The partial schematic drawings of the proposals

were so sketchy that they were incomplete and inadequate in
detail for conducting a complete review, even of established
objective requirements then existing in the "R-6"
district.

(R 517-543, 362-368).
-15-
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37.

Appellant-Scherbelfs architect knew the various

projects proposed in the above described exhibits did not meet
the minimum requirements of the "R-6" district and could not be
approved, even on a schematic basis.

He also knew that they were

otherwise too preliminary and incomplete for zoning review, let
alone application for or issuance of a building permit.

(R 478-

81, 488-490).
38.

The architect testified that before he would submit an

application for a building permit (Exhibit 41D), upon which he
could expect zoning approval to be given and a permit issued, he
would have to generate and prepare the necessary working
drawinqs, detailed information and related specifications.

Such

preparation is a large bulk of the architect's assignment, time
and expense; such work would require at least three (3) months or
more time. None of this work has been done on any of the various
projects proposed.
39.

(R 485-490, 477-78).

Each of the four projects contained in Exhibits 37, 39

and 43 have features which would and did not meet the minimum
criteria for multiple-family dwellings, under the new "R-2H"
provision.15

(R 517-543, 362-368).

15

In comparing "R-6" and "R-2H" requirements, it should be noted
multiple-family dwellings can be constructed in both districts
after design approval, but under different conditions and design
criteria. "R-6" authorizes up to a 75-foot high multiple family
structure as a permitted right, assuming setbacks, parking area,
and the like are provided. "R-2H" permits multiple-family uses
as "conditional uses", but imposes more restrictive desian
criteria, such as maximum heights (45 feet), reduced density, (19
(footnote continued)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I
1#

"SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellant-Scherbel had the obligation to obtain the

trial transcript and such other facts and documents, admitted in
the trial below, to demonstrate to this Court that the trial
court's findings were unsupported by the recori or that it
manifestly misapplied applicable law.f. Appellfant's brief is
required to reference that record to demonstrate he has met its
burden of proof to reverse the lower court judqment.
Appellant has failed to provide this Court the transcript
and documents referred to in his brief; as a consequence, he has
failed to reference the record in his brief.

The City contests

his version of the record but is unable to respond because it Was
not provided as required by the rules. Therefore, appellantSchdrbel's factual statement should be stricken or notconsidered? and, the appeal should be dismissed because there is
no factual premise to support appellant-Scherbelfs argument,
2.

Uncontroverted evidence before the lower Court and now

before this Court clearly supports the lower tribunal's Findings
of Fact and Judgment.

It demonstrates that appellant-Scherbel

submitted such sketchy and preliminary plans, which did not meet
even existing zoning, that he was not entitled to a buildinq
permit on any of the development proposals submitted.

Further,

the "plans" were hastily prepared and made only in response to

units per acre), and some increased setbacks.
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prospective zoning and land use changes to City law proposed to
protect the Historic District of the Avenues, where appellant's
property was located.

As such, his plans failed to meet the test

of this Court's decision in Western Equities and no vesting
occurred to entitle him to a building permit on any of the
numerous proposals submitted to the City.
3.

The Historic District ordinance and its appeal

procedures comport with constitutional principles and are
v

3

mechanism before the City Council is consistent with other zoning

£

consistent with State enabling power.

The final hearing

laws, which provide for the City Council to hear appeals from the >s
Planning and Zoning Commission.
However, even if the hearing process should be viewed as
executive rather than legislative, the Mayor approved the hearing us:
process before the Council and appellant-Scherbel has no basis on .:&
which to complain on the procedure utilized in this case.

This

conclusion is particularly compelled by the fact that the complex
issues of land use can be viewed as a mixture of executive and
legislative functions; great deference should be allowed local
government to experiment and prepare ordinances to solve local
problems, where they are not clearly unconstitutional or in
derogation of statutory law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT-SCHERBEL CANNOT SUSTAIN HIS BURDEN
OF PROOF TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-18-

:

FINDINGS ARE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE OR THAT IT MISAPPLIED THE APPLICABLE
LAW FROM THE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT.
It is the well settled law of Utah that Findings of Fact of
the trial court and the lower court judgment are presumptively
valid.

The appellant has the burden,, from the record below, to

demonstrate that the trial court ruled contrary to the weight of
the evidence or manifestly misapplied applicable law.

Regarding

this well recognized presumption of lower court decisional
validity, this Court held:
"It being a well settled rule of judicial review
that the trial court's findings will not be
disturbed unless they are clearly against the
weight of the evidence or it manifestly appears
the Court misapplied the law to the established
facts." Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 28
U.2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (1972) citing Hardy v.
Hendrickson, 27 U.2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972).
^
In applying those legal principles, the Court's attention is
directed to the fact that appellant-Scherbel has failed to make
even one citation to the record of the lower court proceedings,
which were transmitted to this Court.

To the contrary, the only

references in appellant's brief are to trial exhibits, which Mr.
Scherbel did not bring to this Court.

Neither did Scherbel bring

the trial transcript, even though his first briefed issued claims
an equitable theory of "vesting" which is desparately hinged on
the facts.

Similarly, not one reference is made to the Amended

Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law which were entered by
Court interlineation, after consideration anr* exhaustive lower
court review.

(R 353-369).
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However, even more revealing and offensive, as a matter of
substance, is the myopic selection of favorable allegations or
characterization made by appellant-Scherbel.

His selective

factual assertions seem to be made on the premise that omission
of adverse facts will negate their existence.

To the contrary,

on appeal the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to
the party prevailing below.
In addition, appellant-Scherbel is in flagrant violation of
Rule 75(p) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires
the record to be filed with the Court and for a party to make
specific references to that record in Supreme Court briefing.
Such reauirements are to assure that the actual trial developed
facts are properly before this Court, rather than fanciful
imaginings or wishful and gratuitous creation of non-existent
trial record by the parties.

It also prevents a waste of court

effort and friction between counsel in trying to divine what
transpired below from the biased or selective memories of the
parties.
This Court has previously ruled that factual statements
should not be considered by this Court.
P.2d 732, 734 (Utah 1983).

State v. Williamson, 674

It is, therefore, respectfully

submitted that appellant-Scherbel's recitation of fact should be
stricken and not considered by this Court.

Also, applying the

presumptive validity of the lower court findings and decision,
they should be affirmed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE CITY HAD
THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO AMEND
ZONING ORDINANCES, CREATE A HISTORICAL
DISTRICT, AND MAKE THEM APPLICABLE TO
APPELLANT, UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
It is the uncontested law of this, State that property owners
hold their property subject t^ the zoning ordinances of local
municipalities.

This is true even when the ordinances may

severely restrict or limit the range of possible uses; it is also
true if development criteria are changed which were formerly
available and contemplated by a property owner, so long as the
ordinances substantially advance legitimate Governmental goals.
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, et al. ^.. 617 P. 2d
388 (Utah, 1980).

i

.v

Illustrative of these conclusions are decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court.

It has upheld the right of municipalities to

change ordinances to preserve their environment; to regulate
uses, density and the orderly development of residential
districts; to require compatibility reviews for various reasons;
and to preserve historical sites and districts.

See, Agins v.

City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 65 L.Ed.2d 106, 100 S.Ct. 2138
(1980), approving a change from 1 acre to 5 acre lots, with
compatibility review; Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 57 L.Ed.2d 631, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (1978), authorizing
an historical compatability review; generally, see also: Euclid
v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 71 L.Ed. 303, 47 S.Ct. 114 (1926).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

In the lower courtf appellant-Scherbel did not controvert
the City's position and evidence that the independent downzoning
changes and the adoption of the

fl

R-2H" and Historic District

provisions were done for important, countervailing and compelling
public interests, unequivically recognized by the Supreme
Court.

However, the relief Mr. Scherbel now seeks requires this

Court to find that these ordinances are invalid or should be
subordinated to plaintiff's private right to develop.
Clearly, the City's creation of conditional uses, reduction
of permitted maximum height and density; requirement of design
review; and increases of certain design criteria, to reaulate
future development on the City's lower avenues are well within
the general and designated zoning powers of the City.

Each is

designed to protect, preserve and enhance the quality of life and
preserve the character of the Avenues Historic District.

Such

important goals and public interests should not be sacrificed or
subordinated to permit private economic windfall to appellant,
who knowingly assumed the risk of pending changes and

>

intentionally failed to take the necessary actions, which would
have entitled him to secure a building permit, prior to the
pending changes.
The legitimacy of the governmental purpose in these

-

ordinances cannot be raised the first time on appeal and even, if
the contrary were true, they facially survive challenge.
Appellant-Scherbel's challenge of them must fail.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT

III

THE UNCONTPOVEPTED EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED APPELLANT-SCHERBEL WAS NOT AND HAS
NEVER BEEN ENTITLED TO ISSUANCE OF A BUILDING
PERMIT; THEREFORE, THERE HAS BEEN NO UNLAWFUL
DENIAL UPON WHICH MANDAMUS CAN BE BASED.
Appellant-Scherbel

alleged

t h a t on Q-r/-about March 2 4 , 1980%,.

t h r o u g h March 2 8 , 1 9 8 0 , h e a t t e m p t e d
which was i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y

refused.

to secure a building
T h a t a l l e g a t i o n was

by o t h e r w i t n e s s e s and e v e n c o n t r a d i c t e d
example,

in v e r i f i e d

permit,

disputed

by t h e a p p e l l a n t .

p l e a d i n g s , Mr. S c h e r b e l s t a t e d he

For

relied

upon and s u b m i t t e d t h e 3 5 ~ u n i t p l a n s s u b m i t t e d O c t o b e r 2 4 ,
(Exhibit 37P); c o n t r a r y w i s e ,

at trial

testified

" i n q u i r i e s b a s e d upon t h e 3 2 - u n i t p r o j e c t
F u r t h e r , based

i n t h e S t a t e m e n t of F a c t s ,
p r o v e n t h a t no a p p l i c a t i o n
submitted
existing

he made h i s

of E x h i b i t

upon u n c o n t r o v e r t e d

evidence already

under

i n c l u d i n g E x h i b i t 39P.

^,

then^

l a w , n o p e r m i t c o u l d h a v e b e e n g r a n t e d ^for any of

projects,

cited

irrefutably

f o r a b u i l d i n g p e r m i t was e v e r
In f a c t ,

-v

39P*"^.-^-r^,..aS''%

i t h a s b e e n a d m i t t e d and

to a City Building O f f i c i a l .

1979

the

T h u s , even a s s u m i n g a r g u e n d o a

p r e m a t u r e a p p l i c a t i o n had b e e n m a d e — s e p a r a t e and a n a r t

from

historical

accepted

compatibility

by t h e C i t y b e c a u s e of

design review--it

c o u l d n o t be

t h e numerous zoning v i o l a t i o n s

in the preliminary p l a n s ,

contained

the incomplete data for r e q u i r e d

r e v i e w ; and t h e l a c k of w o r k i n g d r a w i n g s ,

zoning

demonstrating

S t a t e m e n t of F a c t s , P a r a g r a p h s 7 , 8 , 1 4 , 1 8 , 2 3 , and 3 6 - 3 9 .
-23-
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compliance with various city ordinances. 1 7 Appellant-Scherbel
and his architect knew such plans would not qualify to receive
zoning approval nor a building permit.

Therefore, he could have

no reasonable expectation that a permit could be applied for or
issued.

See Western Equities, supra.

Plaintiff simply cannot show any unlawful refusal.

This

Court has already acknowledqed that mandamus will not lie, unless
the petitioner had submitted all the applications, plans and
specifications, demonstrating compliance with applicable City

^

codes and ordinances.

^

Thus, the lower court was correct in

ruling no mandamus would properly lie based on appellant's

m-

premature application and inadequate and non-complying plans.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COUPT PROPERLY HELD APPELLANT IS
NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF FROM THE
COURT TO ESTOP THE CITY FROM APPLYING THE nR2H" PROVISIONS BECAUSE HE HAD NO PROJECT THAT
WAS ENTITLED TO VESTED RIGHTS TO DEVELOP.
Appellant-Scherbel claims he has rights to develop under "R6", which he claims are provisions vested to him and a shield
from him otherwise complying with the newer

,f

R-2Hn provisions.

Such an equity claim requests the court estop the City from
enforcing its legislation enacted for the public's benefit,
thereby giving appellant a benefit of laws no longer in effect.
In such equity claims, relief is not granted unless a plaintiff

17

Section 51-32-7, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,
1965, as amended.
-24-
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m

can meet the heavy burden of demonstrating one party has taken
unconscionable or unfair advantage of the other.
particularly true in zoning matters.

This is

See, Western Land Equities

v. City of Logan, et al. , 617 P.2d 335 (Utah, 1980).
Western Equities, is a watershed zonina and land use
development casfe in which this Court adopted a variation of an
admittedly minority position on vested rights and zoning
estoppel.

It recognized that the majority position generally

requires a property owner to obtain a building permit and be
under actual and substantial physical construction in order to
prove "substantial reliance" upon the permit, before becoming
shielded from changes in zoning ordinances. 1 8
The court noted that prepermit or general preconstruction
activities such as preparing architectural drawing or plans,
surveying and cleaning of land (prior to official approval of the
pflans) would not be substantial enough to justify estoppel. This
Court examined and rejected the majority and minority positions
to formulate its own objective rule, in order to establish some
predictability--predictability which the City submits must be
even-handedly applied. Appellant-Scherbel relies on Western Equities to support his
vesting claim, but City submits that application of the Western
Land Equities case to the facts involved in this litigation

Western Equities, supra, at p. 392.
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dictates appellant has no vested rights.

In fact, contrary to

appellant's claim, the key facts of record demonstrate that to
give appellant vested rights would violate the spirit, letter and
express purpose of Western Equities.

The following will analyse

this case in light of the specifics of the former landmark
decision.
A.

Comparison of Facts

Western Equities involved a property owner of "M-lff land
that submitted a plan to the City of Logan for approval of a
subdivision of single-family homes.

It was stipulated that the

subdivision plan met all of the minimum requirements applicable
to subdivisions and zoninq.

The procedures reauired approval

of preliminary and final plans from the Planning Commission with
administrative appeal from an adverse decision to the City
Council.
The Planning Commission became concerned that single-family
subdivisions were not appropriate uses in manufacturing zones,
althouah authorized by the ordinances.

Approval on the pending

request was delayed until intervening legislation was passed
after which the subdivision was denied.

The denial was affirmed

on appeal to the City Council.
This Court noted:

19

Id. at p. 390.

20

Id. at p. 389.

(1) The proposal for zoning changes arose

-26-
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after and out of the proposed project; (2) the legislative
changes while legitimate, were not something the owner could
anticipate; and (3) there was onlv one plan or alternative before
the court; it had been produced in reliance on the "M-l" zoning
and it also had complied in all particulars with the minimum
requirements of applicable ordinances at the time of
submission.

As submitted, the plan could have been approved.

By uncontroverted facts set forth above in the Statement of
Facts, the opposite is true in this case.

The facts of the case

at bar demonstrate:
1.

The proposal for changes in zoning predate the

consideration of any of the plaintiff's projects.

This fact is

true whether one compares the time of formal filing, the initial
formal review by City, initial action on proposals, or council
action.
2.

Appellant-Scherbel as property owner, knew of proposals

for changing zoning before initiating preparation of any plans.
He admitted he was attempting to pursue some kind of development
before changes might restrict the opportunities and selected an
architect to try to push it through.

He and his architect also

Formal filings occurring on Petition No. 569 on July 5, 1979
vs. October 24, 1979; initial review by Planning Commission on
September 13, 1979 vs. November 6, 1979 presentation; Petition
569 approved November 8, 1979 by Planning Commission vs. HLC
denies 35~unit project December 4, 1979, but Planning Commission
reverses January 10, 1980 on 32 units; Council hearings January
31, 1980 on rfR-2Hn vs. February 19 on appeal where design is
disapproved.
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knew of the complications of the Historic District Design Review
process.
3.

Instead of one project being submitted, appellant

submitted four different projects proposals, alternatively and
confusingly proposing plans for 35, 32, 24 and 18 units.
However, none of the proposed projects complied with minimum
zoning requirements in the existing

,f

P-6" zoning reouirements; in

fact, there were numerous and obvious violations.
Thus, the the operative facts are not similar and Land
Equities is not helpful to appellant's case.
B.

All of proposed projects fail to meet the objective

vesting standards set forth in Western Equities.
This Court reviewed existing case law on "vesting" and held:
"The above competing interests are best accommodated in our view by adopting the rule that an
applicant is entitled to a building permit or
subdivision approval if: (1) his proposed
development meets the zoninq requirements in
existence; (2) at the time of his application and
if he proceeds with reasonable diligence; (3)
absent a compelling, countervailing public
interest; (4) Furthermore, if a city or county has
initiated proceedings to amend its zoning
ordinances, a landowner who subsequently makes
application for a permit is not entitled to rely
on the original zoning classification." Id. at
396 (emphasis added).
Under this test, even prior to the adoption of the R-2H"
provisions, appellant-Scherbel's project would have had to:

(a)

meet existing minimum "R-6" requirements; and (b) obtain
uncontested historic design review or wait for five months after
the particular plan had been submitted to the Landmarks
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Committee.
1.

However, the following facts exist:

It is uncontroverted that none of Appellant's proposed

projects conformed to existing n R-6 M minimum reauirements and his
architect knew it.

He knew there were violations or aspects that

could not be given approval.

Be, perhaps> cpuld have designed to

comply, but Appellant-Scherbel wanted to explore alternative
plans which maximized the amenities and desired number of
units.

It was a business decision and assumption of risk.

No

rights existed or vested to any of those four plans under the "R6" zoning.
The Historic District reauired either final approval of the
visual compatibility of the project or, if denied, a minimum 5month mandatory waiting1 oeriod, before a building permit (Exhibit
41D) could be accepted and issued by the City.

That permit

process was premised on the assumption that the plan complied
with all codes and ordinances; however, not one of the four
projects submitted by the appellant met these requirements.
example:
(a)

For

r
Exhibit 37, for 35 units (for which an application was

filed on October 24, 1979 and was rejected by HLC) was never
approved by anyone;
(b)

Exhibit 39 (the 32-unit project) was qenerated just

prior to approval by Planning Commission in January of 1980, but
was rejected by City Council on appeal.

This is the plan

plaintiff claims has vested and for which he sought a building
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permit in March of 3 980; but which did not nualify for a permit
because the 5 month waiting period had not expired.

Further,

even if the action by the City Council was invalidatedf zoning
approval could not be given to Exhibit 39 due to its numerous
zoning violations.

These violations alone defeat any claim of

the five months or vesting for the 32-unit project;
(c) Appellant's application for the 18-unit, with the 24unit alternative (Exhibit 43) was submitted as a new project in
March of 1980.

It did not meet the "R-6" requirements and was

abandoned after April 1, 1980. No requests for a building permit
under this plan were ever alleged.
Therefore, it is clear, that appellant failed to meet the
first requirement of vesting under Western Eauities and the lower
court correctly ruled.
2.

It is the City's position that the application reauired

by Western Equities is, in fact, an application for a building
permit which the owner or architect could reasonably expect to be
granted at least zoning approval for a building permit, if not
the building permit itself.

Appellant-Scherbel contends the

application form for design review in an historical district,
which he filed on October 24, 1979 for a 35-unit project, is the
application upon which his rights are vested.

However, at trial

appellant, his architect and Mr. Hafey of the City each testified
a subsequent building permit application (Ex. 41D) would be
required when the process proceeded beyond the initial schematic
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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preliminary conceptual to definitive plans.
If Mr. Scherbel's contention is accepted by the Court, then
he should equally be vested in rights to construct a convalescent
center as filed in 1977, and the two project alternatives for 18
and 24 units filed in Exhibit 43 in March of 1980. Obviously
such a conclusion is contrary to the intent expressed by the
Court in Western Equities.
However, interestingly, Mr. Scherbel claims vesting in
Exhibit 39 for which he never filed an application before HLC;
this assertion is even further from the policy and rationale of
this Court's ruling.
It is clear from the holding in Western Equities that in
order to vest, a building application must be complete and in
compliance with all applicable zoning and building codes at the
time it is submitted.

The City submits that this holding

requires that the project and an application for a building
permit be designed in sufficient detail that both the developer
and City know essential details of the plan.

Only then can the

predictability spoken of by the Court result.
In this case, Mr. Scherbel is really asking the Court to
estop the City from enforcing its ordinances in order to allow
his architect to design a fifth project of unknown size,
dimensions, materials, and units. He seeks to construct a
project which would finally be designed to meet n R-6 n
requirements, but be exempted from design review and the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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provisions of the "R-2Hff ordinance.
However, granting the plaintiff the right to now redesign
his proiects to meet existing reouirements that he knew about but
which he intentionally chose to disregard, would be contrary to
existing ordinances and the Supreme Court's holding in Western
Equities.

It would not be granting plaintiff the right to

proceed, but the preroaatiye to start over, free of assumed risk.
3.

Allowing appellant to construct a new project under "R-

6" zoning free from "R-2HM provisions encourages waste of public
resources and inappropriate speculation.

Such an unwise court

liberalization of the standards for vesting would encourage
developers to file spurious, meaningless and alternative plans
simply to protect all options.

The review process would, thus,

be unnecessarily made more complex and plan submission a game
with no good faith intent to file definitive plans for meaningful
land use review.
These fears are personified by appellant's conduct in this
case.

Mr. Scherbel wants to be rewarded, after he intentionally

entered a race against the clock to beat pending zoning law
changes.

It rewards him for his mistakes, omissions, assumption

of risk and other business judgments, at the expense of good land
use policy and the public interests.
It is in the public interest to have an historical district
preserved and to save the rights of other property owners.

It is

in the public interest to preserve this historical district from

-32-
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incompatible development and commercial speculation.

These are

significant counter vailing and competing interests which should
be respected, especially in light of appellant-Scherbelfs acts
and omissions to act in full knowledge of the history and pendinq
changes in zoning in the area.
4.

f

Western Equities specifically notes that one who

proceeds while zoning changes are pending is not entitled to rely
on equity.

This is true because there is no good faith reliance

and an informed assumption of risk.
There are no facts suggesting that the City did anything to
stall or delay review of Mr. Scherbel's various projects to
benefit the pending zoning.

further, there are no facts to

suggest that the City, in anyway, passed a zoning change to
discriminate*against appellant's desire to develop.

There is no

reason, in equity, to shield Mr. Scherbel from the results of his
own decisions and actions.
In summary, Mr. Scherbel had no project which meets the
requirements of the Western Equities case.

That case, when

applied to the facts of the case at bar, demonstrates that Mr.
Scherbel has no equitable claim for vesting of development
rights, under the superseded "R-6" zoning.

This Court has taken

an important and novel position to fairly balance competing
interests, by setting up measurable standards to provide
predictability for developers and governments as well.

The

standards were framed to offer some protection to developers who

-33-
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had substantially proceeded with development from last-minute
unanticipated shifts in public policy, without encouraging or
rewarding premature speculation.

Those same standards

specifically note that no such protection or equitable relief is
given for those who intentionally undertake the development
process, when zoning change proposals are pending.2^
To grant appellant-Scherbel vested rights to proceed with
developing any one of the four projects shown in the exhibits
requires the Court to ignore the objective requirements of
Western Equities and encourages and rewards disregard of the old
ordinances, which Scherbel desires to rely upon.

Alternatively,

to grant appellant a vested right to design a new project plan,
to meet old code provisions violates the objective predictability
underpinning the entire decision.
The City submits such a rulina would be error and would
destroy the very purpose the Court labored so carefully in
Western Equities to protect.
POINT V
THE HEARING BEFORE THE CITY COUNCIL REGARDING
THE APPEAL OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION'S
DECISION ON DESIGN REVIEW COMPATABILITY WAS
CONSISTENT WITH BOTH STATE LAW AND CITY
ORDINANCES.
When the Historic District and Landmark Sites ordinance was

Id at p. 396.
Id. at p. 396.
-34-
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Ikacted, the City included, as a discretionary riqht, an appeal
from a decision of the Planning Commission on design review
cornpatability to the Board of City Commissioners.

With the

inception of the council/mayor form of government, the Board of
Commissioners ceased to exist; the right of appeal did not.
Local governments are bound by the provisions of their own
ordinances.

West Gallery v. Salt Lake City, 537 P.2d 1027 (Utah,

1975).
After the change in governmental form, the City, therefore,
had to determine whether the appeal from the planning commission
should be heard before the council or the mayor, not if an appeal
right should be had.

The answer to that question was made by

this Court in the case of Martindale v. Anderson.

Here the

Court was asked to construe the separate .powers of the mayor and
the council under the Alternate Form of^Government Act*
Specifically, the Court determined that the authority to approve
subdivisions and to acquire and dispose of City property was an
executive function, held solely by the Mayor.

Both the executive

and legislative branches had claimed the authority, based upon
differing statutory provisions.

The Court ruled as follows:

"The inconsistencies in the terminology of the
statutes in referring to the approving authority
[of subdivision] is of some concern, but is by no
means over-powering for the following reasons.
* * * It is obvious that the statutes do not
undertake to vest any authority to approve plats

581 P.2d 1022 (Utah, 1978).
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but only to recognize existing authority to
approve and require it to act. Hence, their use
of the terms 'legislative body', 'legislative
authority1, and 'governing body' must be deemed to
have been in their generic sense only, and not an
attempt to designate the functions of any
particular governing body.
"It is also to be observed that the statutes are
of long duration, having been enacted before
strong mayor and council/mayor forms of government
were provided for, and when only traditional forms
of government were available. Consequently, it is
not surprising that they contemplate only a single
governing body exercising both legislative and
executive powers." Id. at 1028 (emphasis added).
The court's response to this new form of government and the
governing statutes was to hold Logan City's ordinance and the
statutes valid and to construe them in light of the intent of the
legislature in providing for a new form of government.

The

Optional Form of Government Act specifically provides that cities
adopting an alternate form of government "shall retain and have
the right, powers and duties now or hereafter granted to
municipalities." 25

The power to grant appeals bemq retained, it

was necessary only to determine which branch of government was to
exercise that power.
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should aqain do
likewise.

It should not hold the City's ordinance void because

it includes the term "board of commissioners"? rather, it should
recognize the "existing authority" formerly held by the Board of
Commissioners and recognize the authority and duty of the City to

Section 10-3-1205, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
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designate and delegate its governmental powers to the aporopriate
branches, under the council-mayor form of government.
In doing so, this Court has held that in dealina with novel
problems, such as this under a new form of city government,
elected officials must be given wide discretion and latitude in
"solving municipal problems:

- *

" [M]unicipal officials must also have the legal
power to deal creatively with extraordinary or
unforeseen circumstances in the provision of
municipal services." Banberry Development v.
South Jordan, 631 P.2d 899, 904 (Utah 1981).

. ' i.

:

The City maintains that the hearing conducted by the City
Council and the provisions for such appeals under the historic
district and -related
reasons.

ff

R-2Hn provisions, was^ proper for three ^

First, the Planning Commission^is a statutorily

authorized body created by City ordinance to advise the
legislative body, the City Council, in zoning matters. ° itappears is obvious, logical and reasonable that the subordinate
body should be held accountable to the Council, pursuant to the
authority granted to the Planning Commission.
has so held in Thurston v. Cache County.27

The Supreme Court

Second, the Mayor, as an exercise of his executive powers in
order to clear up any ambiguity in procedure, authorized the
Council to hear the appeal and delegated the Council to hear the

^Section 10-9-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
27

626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981),
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matter.
Council.

The Mayor also acquiesced in the decision of the City
(See Statement of Facts).

The leaal power of cities to provide that some governmental
powers may be delegated or acquiesced in is recognized by the
Supreme Court decision (again involving the Logan City Council,
rendered two years after Martindale) in Western Land Equities v.
Logan City , supra.

In Western Equities the Supreme Court

reviewed Logan City's ordinance which set forth the procedure for
obtaining subdivision approval. The ordinance required appeal of
an adverse Planning Commission to the city council, not the
mayor. 98 This procedure was a reversal of the contested issue of
the court in Martindale.

In the later case, the governmental

branches were not contesting areas of jurisdiction and the City
hearing procedure before the Council was not held invalid.
Similarly, it should be noted that the situation now before
the Court is unlike that before the Supreme Court in Martindale
and more similar to Western Equities.

In Martindale , the city

council and the mayor were challenging the power of each otherf
under the new form of government.

The Supreme Court ruled that

the city council had no executive powers which it could delegate
to the mayor and, therefore, its unwarranted intrusion into that
area was improper.

The Court denied the city council's right to

unilaterally supervise the mayor's action in acquiring or

'Western Equities, supra at 389.
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disposing of city property or approving subdivisions.
The matter now before the Court involves no contested issue
of procedure or power between the council and the mayor. The
mayor and council having resolved the issue for the City by
agreement and city ordinance, it is not a proper issue, to be
raised by appellant-Scherbel.'- It is either a proper Council
function or if an executive power, one delegated by the Mayor to
the Council for hearing.

Under either, Mr. Scherbel has no cause

to challenge the procedure.
Third, the City's legislative body (the City Council) has
been given the power to enact the zoning ordinances and
regulations of the City, pursuant to the recommendation of the
Planning Commission."

The State legislature has clearly

designated the city council as th£ prpper body to hear and
determine zoning-'issues; the law states:
"For the purpose of-promoting health, safety,
morals and the general welfare of the community,
the legislative body of cities and towns is
empowered to regulate and restrict the height,
number of stories and size of building and other
structures, the percentage of lot that may be
occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other
open spaces, the density of population, and the
location and use of buildings, structures and land
for trade, industry, residence, or other
purposes." Section 10-9-1, Utah Code Ann., 1953,
as amended (emphasis added).
Thus, it is absolutely clear that the City Council did not usurp
an improper function by hearing the appeal from the Planning

Section 10-9-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
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Commission.

In factf this body was specifically empowered to do

so by the State legislature and by executive order of the Mayor.
Supportive of this conclusion is the holding of this Court
which recognizes that local government has reasonable flexibility
to address creatively municipal problems.

It held:

,f

[I]t must be realized that it is impractical for
statutes to spell out to the last detail all of
the things city governments must do to perform the
functions imposed upon them by law. This court
has in numerous cases recognized this and has held
that cities have those powers which are expressly
granted and also those necessarily implied to
carry out such responsibilities." Call v. City of
West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 218, 219 (Utah 1979)
(emphasis added).
Similarly, in reviewinq the powers of counties and
municipalities, the Court again recently held:
"When the state has granted welfare power to local
governments, those governments have independent
authority apart from, and in addition to, specific
grants of authority to pass ordinances which are
reasonably and appropriately related to the
objectives of that power, i.e., providing for the
public safety, health, morals, and welfare,
(citations omitted) Any the courts will not
interfere with the legislative choice of the means
selected unless it is arbitray, or is directly
prohibited by or is inconsistent with the policy
of the state or the United States. * * * But
specific grants should generally be construed with
reasonable latitude in light of the broad language
of the general welfare clause which may supplement
the power found in a specific allegation.
"Broad construction of the powers of counties and
cities is consistent with the current needs of
local governments." State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d
1116, 1126 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added).
The City respectfully submits that the actions of the Mayor
and the City Council regarding the hearing conducted by the City
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Council from the Plannina Commission's decision was and is
consistent with all of the state statutes pertaining to enabling
power of cities.

The City ordinance and policy decisions are

well within both the discretion of the Mayor and the jurisdiction
of the City Council.

The Court should respect and give deference

to their resolution of hearingsvon these difficult and complex
land use issues.
POINT VI
AN AGGRIEVED PERSONfS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO
AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL CANNOT BE ABRIDGED.
Assuming, arguendo, the Court is not pursuaded that the City
Council lawfully heard the appeal regardina Appellant-Scherbelfs
proposed project, appellant still should not prevail.
The City's ordinance provides for an appeal from the
Planning Commission's decision.

If the hearing before the City

Council was void, the matter must be remanded for proper action
before an authorized forum.

The right of appeal created by

ordinance cannot be extinguished, ignored, or bypassed.

Any

attempt to do so would be in derogation of the City's own
lawfully-enacted procedures and constitutional principles of due
process of law.

Thus, the remedy is not reversal, but remand to

the Mayor.
POINT VII
THE HEARING CONDUCTED BY THE CITY COUNCIL IN
FULLY REVIEWING THE PLANNING COMMISSION'S
DECISION WAS VALID IN ALL RESPECTS.
The Planning Commission is an advisory body, created
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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pursuant to statute, to the City Council.

The Commission is

charged with the responsibility of making recommendations to the
Council regarding all zoning matters.
It is fatuous to suggest, as the appellant-Rcherbel has
done, that the Council is precluded from inquiring fully into the
actions or recommendations of its subordinate and advisory
department.

Thurston, supra.

The plaintiff has cited no

authority whatsoever for his position that the scope of the
Council's hearing was improper.
The minutes before the Council and the Planning Commission
both indicate items other than the development standards were
discussed.

It is acknowledged that such items were presented to

both the Planning Commission and the City Council; however, it is
submitted that none of these other items were significant.
This Court dismissed a similar allegation regarding the
scope of a hearing conducted before a County Commission, as
follows:
"Plaintiffs specifically point out that the
Planning Commission and Board of County
Commissioners of Cache County placed undue
reliance on objections filed by landowners in the
vicinity. While it is true that the consent of
neighboring landowners may not be made a criterion
for the issuance or denial or a conditional use
permit, (citation omitted) there is no impropriety
in the solicitation of, or reliance upon,
information which may be furnished by other

Section 10-9-4, Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, as amended.
Section 10-9-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
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landowners in the vicinity of the subject property,
at a public hearing. There is ample evidence to
suggest that the input of neighboring landowners
in the instant case was of this advisory
nature." Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440
(Utah, 1980) at 445.
Appellant-Scherbel has not challenged the Firtdinq of Facts and
the Conclusions of Law of the City Council in this lawsuit* which
set forth the basis of the denial of the City Council. .Said
findings and conclusions are based totally on the development
standards and speak for themselves.
It is respectfully submitted that the conduct of the City
Council in reviewing the decision of the Planning Commission in
this matter was entirely proper and should be upheld.
POINT VIII
THE CITY'S NEWLY-ENACTED "R-^H" ZONING
ORDINANCE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE OF
PROCEDURAL FEATURES. _
A.

THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT TO HAVE THE MATTER
HEARD BY THE CITY'S BOARE) OF ADJUSTMENT.

One t h r u s t of
zoning o r d i n a n c e

the appellant's

fl

R-2H n

i m p r o p e r l y d e l e g a t e s m a t t e r s t o HLC JLnu

R-2H n z o n i n g c l a s s i f i c a t i o n

regulations

,f

argument i s t h a t t h e

d e r o g a t i o n of t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e P o a r d of
The

. ..

for h i s t o r i c a l

residential

a r e p e r m i t t e d by r i g h t and o t h e r s ,
dwellings, are authorized
requires that before

Adjustment.r

sets forth

specific

neighborhoods.

including

as conditional

Some u s e s

multiple-family

uses.

The

ordinance

t h e Board may a p p r o v e t h e c o n d i t i o n a l

t h e p l a n must r e c e i v e d e s i g n r e v i e w a p p r o v a l

zonina

use,

for compatibility
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the district.

That desian review must be obtained from the HLC

or the appeal process.
If a favorable recommendation is given by HLC or through the
appeal process, then the application is forwarded to the Board of
Adjustment.32

The Board may then either approve or recommend

denial of the project.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Thurston, supra, is
dispositive of appellant-Scherbel's argument in this case.

In

Thurston, this Court analyzed Section 17-27-16, ° which is almost
identical to Section 10-9-12,34 Utah Code Annotated.

Both

sections deal with powers granted to the county's and the city's
respective boards of adjustment.

This Court held:

"The act authorizes, but does not require, the
county commission to invest the board of
adjustments, by resolution, with the power to
issue special exceptions to general zoning
ordinances. Where, and only where, such an
investing resolution has been adopted, the board
of adjustments is aiven statutory authority to
hear and decide requests for special exceptions.
"Plaintiffs infer, from the foregoing statutory
framework, that the board of adjustments is the
only proper authority for the issuance of
conditional use permits and must be invested with
the power so to act; also that the board of
adjustments is the only proper appellate body
within the administrative system . . .
Such a
construction not only ignores the plain import of

32

Section 51-41A-10, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,
1965, as amended.
33

Attached as Appendix 2.

3

Attached as Appendix 3.
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the statutory languaqe, toqether with the
necessary implications to be drawn therefrom, but
places the county commission in the untenable
position with regard to its ability to enforce its
own zoning resolution.
"That the county commission need not invest the
board of adjustments with the power, to .issue
special exceptions is clear from the statutory
languaqe. [T]he board of adjustments is
constituted by statute a form for review of all
administrative zoning decisions, but nowhere is it
made the exclusive repository of appellate
powers. Should the county commission elect not to
bestow upon the board of adjustments the power to
issue special exemptions, but to place such power
in the planning commission instead, and to reserve
to itself the final say in the dispensation of
such exemptions, we cannot say that it has sought
to clothe itself with authority not granted by the
legislature." Id. at 445, 446 (emphasis in
original) .
?,"""••"'...
From the above, it is clear that the City Council has the
legislative prerogative of designating the forum(s) it deems
appropriate, together with any reasonable requirements it
determines necessary, in providing for the procedural and
substantive provisions of the City's zoning ordinances.
B.

THERE IS NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT BARRING AN
APPEAL TO THE CITY COUNCIL.

Appellant-Scherbel has, further, challenged the validity of
the ordinance which provides that any appeal from the Planning
Commission shall go to the City Council.

This argument is

identical to that discussed in Point V, VI and VII, above.
C.

INDIVIDUALS GIVEN NOTICE OF LAND USE ISSUES
NEED NOT BE PARTIES IN AN APPEAL OF THE
HEARING DECISION WHEN THEY WERE NOT PARTIES
TO THE ORIGINAL HEARING.

"f

Appellant-Scherbel has also argued that the appeal procedure
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established by said ordinance requires that all owners of
property be joined as parties in the appeal, this statement is
potentially incorrect.

A reading of the statute demonstrates

that it only requires that notice be given to the property owners
within a 400-foot radius of the property, for which the owner or
developer are seeking a conditional use.
Full compliance with the law was made with this law and
appellant's position should be summarily rejected.

Notice

requirements do not require them all to be parties in an appeal
process.

Without citation of relevant authority, this "novel"

theory must be rejected.
CONCLUSION
The City respectfully submits that the trial court's
judgment was correct.

It ruled correctly that appellant had no

right to a building permit, based upon any one of his four
projects or sets of schematic drawings.

The record more than

adequately supports the lower court's Findings that appellant's
actions seeking a building permit fell far short of those
required by the Supreme Court in Western Equities. These
deficiencies include:
1.

The schematics violate existing zoning ordinance;

2.

The schematics are not sufficient to identify the

precise building to be built;

Section 51-14A-13, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,
1965, as amended.
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3.

Zoning variances were reauired for all proposed

projects, which had not been obtained;
4.

No building permit was ever applied for;

5. A zoning change predates and was the catalyst for
appellant-Scherbel pursuing his*proposed development.

At all r

times,.-.the zoning change process was under consideration and took
effect while appellant-Scherbel was still pursuing initial desian
concepts of his project(s); and
6.

No working drawings existed which identify the precise

structure to be built or by which the City could determine
compliance with applicable zoning ordinances and building codes.
Regardless of whether the City Council properly or
improperly heard the appeal from the Planning Commission,
appellant's request for a permit cannot be granted.

The

appellant's failure to do more than submit a myriad of conceptual
drawings for possible projects, preserves no right under Western
Equities as discussed above. -*-.

c

The City has validly adopted development standards is based
upon both state law and the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Penn. Central, supra.
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff's request for mandamus
and other equitable relief should be denied and the actions and
ordinances of City should be upheld in all respects.
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DATED this 6th day of December, 1984.

ROGER F. CUTLER
Salt Lake City Attorney

JUDY F. LEVER
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Respondent
cclOl
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JUDY F. LEVER
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Defendant
100 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah ;84111
Telephone:
535-7788

IN THE THIRD J U D I C I A L DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACK F . SCHERBEL,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
C i v i l No. C 80-1338
vs,
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
et al. ,
Defendants.

The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d
17,

1982, before

Plaintiff
Chai,

matter

t h eHonorable

was p r e s e n t

was h e a r d

at trial

Judge Ernest

and represented

on D e c e m b e r -

F . Baldwin.

by c o u n s e l ,

Mr.

HenryU

I I f and the defendants were represented by Judy F. Lessr

and Paul G. Maughan, Assistant City Attorney's for Salt LafeSqf
Corporation.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings on file and fe^r
heard the testimony of witnesses and the evidence presented^
trial

and the argument of counsel, having heretofore

entered

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore,
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ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

~

The plaintiff's complaint for extraordinary relief is

hereby dismissed.
2.

The decision of the Salt Lake City Council denying

conceptual approval to the plaintifffs proposed construction
project is hereby affirmed.

The decision of the Council was not

arbitrary or capricious, nor did it exceed the authority of the
City Council.
3.

The terms and provisions contained in Section 51-32-8(3)

relating to visual compatibility are not unconstitutionally
vague.
4.

Section 51-14A-1, et seq., Revised Ordinances of Salt

Lake City, Utah, pertaining to the creation of residential "R-2H"
zoning districts is not invalid nor unconstitutional.
5.

The action of the City Council in downzoning the East

Central Avenues, as described in Ordinance #10 of 1980, to a
residential nR-2H" classification was not invalid.
6.

The plaintiff is not entitled to an order permitting

plaintiff to build any of his proposed construction projects, and
has no vested right to construc^""any such project(s).
DATED this r/S
1111

r

' ' •"

day o f / — p y> /-<' xi „
"' ' •

v"

"

, 1983.

" "

BY THE COURT^
/

ERNEST F . BALDWIN, JUDGE
Daputy CU&K

I
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERED
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order to Henry K. Chai, II, SNOW, CHRISTENSEN USD
MARTINEAU, Attorney for Plaintiff, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventfc
Floor, P.O. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, this /(^

Jn/^k^L^

of

. y «%.ur^a.*—

1983.
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JUDY F . LEVER
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Defendant
100 C i t y & C o u n t y B u i l d i n g
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84111
Telephone:
535-7788
IN THE THIRD J U D I C I A L DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACK F .

SECOND AMENDED
• FINDINGS OF FACT
AND COFZLUSIONS
OF LAW

SCHERBEL,
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FINDINGS OF FACT
I.

Controversy,

1.
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Application

24,

1979,

and P r o p e r t y

plaintiff

filed

Interests.
with S a l t
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City

Corporation ("City") a completed "Application for a Permit to
Construct a New Building or S t r u c t u r e Within an H i s t o r i c
D i s t r i c t " ( " A p p l i c a t i o n " ) Exhibit 2-P.

This Application form was

submitted "to t h e Planning and Zoning Commission ("Commission")
and to t h e H i s t o r i c a l Landmark Committee" ("Landmark") under the
Zoning Ordinance of S a l t Lake C i t y . "

The Application requested

approval t o " b u i l d a 35 u n i t condominium p r o j e c t " on p a r t of the
e a s t side of "E" S t r e e t between F i r s t and Second Avenues.
Conceptual drawings (Exhibit 37-P) were submitted with the
Application form which was known as Case No. 164.
2.

The a p p l i c a t i o n covered four p a r c e l s of property.

P l a i n t i f f then and a t the time of t r i a l owned three of the four
parcels.

He did not own the fourth p a r c e l , nor did he have a

binding agreement t o acquire i t .

He did have o r a l permission of
•Mi*"-

i t s owner t o include i t in h i s Application.
3.

When t h e Application was f i l e d , t h e property was zoned &

"R-6".
II.
4.

***
Consolidated Chronology
In 1976 r t h e City enacted the H i s t o r i c D i s t r i c t and

Landmark S i t e s Ordinances, Section 51-32-1 e t s e a . , Revised
Ordinances of S a l t Lake City ("Sites Ordinance").
5.

Under t h e S i t e s Ordinance, in 1978 the City established

the Avenues H i s t o r i c D i s t r i c t .

P l a i n t i f f f s property and proposed

redevelopment i s in the Avenues H i s t o r i c D i s t r i c t .
6.

The p l a i n t i f f and h i s a r c h i t e c t knew of the design
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review process required by t h e S i t e s Ordinance by virtue of each
independently having e a r l i e r submitted a proposed project tt*
Landmark for review.
T.

In November of 19 78 f some of the property owners aM

r e s i d e n t s of the Avenues and t h e Greater Avenues Community
Council ("GACC") began a d r i v e t o have the City adopt a new lone
and to "downzone" or change the zoning of the East Central
Avenues, which included t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s property, to tore
r e s t r i c t i v e zones.

These changes in zoning were i^^iidEatad with

t h e City in January of 19 79 and processed throughout the yesc by
the various City departments.

The proposal was filed as Petition

No. 579 of 1979 by t h e City in J u l y of t h a t year.
8.

In the Spring of 1979 r p l a i n t i f f

employed Mr. Babcock,

an a r c h i t e c t , to design a condominium p r o j e c t under the "R-€P
high density zoning t o meet the v i s u a l compatibility requirements
of the s i t e o r d i n a n c e s .

At t h a t time, both Mr. Babcock and the

p l a i n t i f f were aware of tfee=~proposal to downzone the East Ctetral
Avenues, which included t h e p l a i n t i f f 1 s property.
9.

On July 5, 1979, said P e t i t i o n 579-79 was filed wiifi the

City by Kathy Wacker, GACC, e t a l . requesting the creation of an
M

R-2Hn zone c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and the downzoning of the East Central

p a r t of the Avenues, including p l a i n t i f f f s
10.

"E" Street property.

In August of 1979, Babcock informally contacted

Landmark's chairperson t o d i s c u s s the p l a i n t i f f f s project a d to
identify any p o s s i b l e Landmark concerns for such a project. The
- 3 - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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pending zoning changes for the, property were also discussed at
this time.
11.

On October 11, 1979, the Commission scheduled a public

hearing to consider the adoption of the proposednR-2Hn district
and the downzoning for the East Central Avenues requested by
Petition 579.

The hearing on said petition was continued to

October 25, 1979.

Plaintiff attended the informal hearing before

the Commission.
12.

After the filing of the Application referred to in

paragraph 1 on October 24, 1979, the Application accompanied by
conceptual drawings of a 75' high, 35-unit multiple family
dwelling (Exhibit 37-P) was referred to Landmark for design
review and a recommendation as to visual compatibility under the
Sites Ordinance.
13.

On November 8, 1979, the Planning Commission formally
<£~??J

recommended _approvaiy-&t P e t i t i o n 579 proposing adoption of the
n

*^

j

R-2Hn d i s t r i c t and t h e downzoning of the East Central Avenues,
isO-»tuo^

and it\referred the matter to the City Commission for further
action; ^
14.

U'&~&&-<o

X^w^z^^-*-

In November and December 1979, plaintiff and Mr.

Babcock met with Landmark and its architectural subcommittee to
review the conceptual plan for compliance with the Sites
Ordinancefs development standards so that they could receive a
favorable recommendation from Landmarks.

During this process

they made some changes in an attempt to address concerns raised
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by i t s members.
15.

On December 4, 1979, Landmark, a f t e r negative reco^en-

dation from i t s a r c h i t e c t u r a l subcommittee, denied the
Application a f t e r determining t h e proposed 75' high, 35-unit
p r o j e c t violated t h e development standards pertaining to heicfit
and s c a l e and was not v i s u a l l y compatible with adjacent
buildings.
16.

On December 6, 1979, p l a i n t i f f sent a l e t t e r to the

Commission r e q u e s t i n g in e f f e c t ,

t h a t i t approve the Application

notwithstanding Landmark f s adverse recommendation.
17.

On December 13, 1979, t h e Commission was presented with

plaintiff's

l e t t e r ^ a n d h i s o r a l request to reverse Landmark.

GAAC, supporting Landmark's recommendation, requested an
opportunity to be heard on the i s s u e .

The Commission scheduled

an informal hearing to consider p l a i n t i f f ' s appeal at i t s next
meeting (January 10, 1980).
18.

In January 1980, t h e Council-Mayor form of governmsat

went i n t o effect in the C i t y , r e p l a c i n g the Commission form.
19.

In early January of 1980, the City Council advertise! a

p u b l i c hearing to be held January 29, 1980 to consider Petitiaa
579 requesting the c r e a t i o n of t h e "R-2H" d i s t r i c t and downzemng
of the East Central Avenues a r e a .
20.

In p r e p a r a t i o n for the design review appeal before tte

Planning Commission, Babcock prepared conceptual sketches for a
second or revised p r o j e c t - 65' high with 32 u n i t s .
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changes were subsequently refined and submitted in the

form of Exhibit 39~P directly to the Planning Commission without
prior review by Landmark.

Finding this revised or second project

visually compatible with development standards, the Planning
Commission disagreed with Landmark and conceptually approved it
after the hearing on January 10, 1980.
21.

On January 11, 1980, GAAC appealed the decision of the

Planning Commission in a letter addressed to the Mayor.
22.

On January 29, 1980f the Salt Lake City Attorney's

office provided Mayor Ted Wilson and the City Council with an
opinion letter regarding the procedure for hearing GAAC's appeal.
23.

On January 29, the hearing on Petition 579 before the

City Council was continued to January 31, 1980. After the
hearing the City Council conceptually approved the proposals and
directed the preparation of formal ordinances.
24.

On February 4, 1980, the City Council notified

plaintiff's attorney by letter that it would hear GACC's appeal
of the Planning Commission's design approval given to plaintiff's
project on February 19, 1980.
25.

On February 5, 1980, Mr. Babcock presented to Landmark

the second or revised 32-unit project (Exhibit 39-P) approved
earlier, by the Commission.

Landmark found the second or revised

project to be similarly incompatible for the same reasons
associated with the original 35 unit project.
26.

On February 19, 1980 Mayor Ted L. Wilson issued
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Executive Order #2 d e s i g n a t i n g t h e City Council to hear GACC's
appeal.
27.

On February 19, 1980, t h e City Council in i t s meeting

passed the ordinances c o n c e p t u a l l y approved in January creating
the

lf

R-2H,f d i s t r i c t and downzoning t h e Avenues.

Both ordinances

were scheduled for p u b l i c a t i o n on February 26, 1980.
28.

On February 19, 1980, during the City Council meeting,

t h e City Council considered GACC's appeal to reverse the Planning
Commission d e c i s i o n and affirm Landmark's recommendation that the
p r o j e c t was v i s u a l l y incompatible with the h i s t o r i c a l d i s t r i c t on
i t s chosen s i t e .

The City Council heard the arguments of GACC,

p l a i n t i f f and other i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s , and reviewed the revised
p l a n s showing 32 u n i t s t i e r e d to 65' high in Exhibit 39-P
approved by t h e Commission.
29.

Consideration on t h e matter was continued to a City

Council meeting on February 20, 1980.

After a field t r i p to t h e

s i t e and f u r t h e r d e l i b e r a t i o n on the matter, the Council found
the design concept to be v i s u a l l y incompatible with the
surrounding s t r u c t u r e s and contrary t o the development standards
applicable in the h i s t o r i c d i s t r i c t .

I t voted to reverse the

d e c i s i o n of t h e Planning Commission and affirmed Landmark's
recommendation.
30.

y

In explaining t h e i r v o t e s , some individual members of

t h e City Council urged p l a i n t i f f to work with GACC to find an
acceptable plan for compatible development on the s i t e .
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to this request, plaintiff authorized Mr. Babcock to explore
redesigning the project.
31.

On February 25, 1980, plaintiff filed suit and was able

to temporarily restrain the scheduled publication of the "R-^H"
and the downzoning ordinances.
32.

On March 3, 1980, plaintiff filed another Application

with the Planning Department known as Landmark Case No. 190,
which schematically proposed a third or revised project 42f high
with 18 units, to be located on two of the fbur original parcels
of property.
3 3.

The Application for Case No. 190 «as heard by Landmark

on March 4, 1980 and referred to the architectural
subcommittee*

Said third project together «ith a fourth

alternative proposing 24 units on three of tte four parcels
(Exhibit 43-P) were considered by the architectual subcommittee
prior to the Landmark meeting of March 17, 1580.
34.

On March 11, 1980, the City adopted written findings of

facts and an order: reversing the Planning Ctenmission, affirming
Landmark, and denying design review approval based upon the 32
unit, 65' high plans of Exhibit 39-P.
35.

On March 17, 1980, Landmark considered the 18-unit 42'

high and the 24 unit alternatives under Case No. 190. Plaintiff
later abandoned said proposals when the "R-2E* and rezoning
ordinances became effective.
36. On March 24, 1980, five months had elapsed since the
-8-
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Application for the 35 u n i t p r o j e c t had been f i l e d .
and p r i o r to March 28, 1980, p l a i n t i f f

At that time

contacted the City to

l e a r n if the City would accept working drawings and issie him a
building permit based on Exhibit 39-P approved by the Commission.
37.

P l a i n t i f f was informed t h a t the Planning Department

could not give him zoning approval on the schematic drssings.
(Exhibit 39-P) f o r :

(1) t h e preliminary plans lacked tie d e t a i l

required to complete a required review for zoning compliance excluding h i s t o r i c a l d i s t r i c t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; and (2) e^n
assuming arguendo, drawings could be prepared t h a t complied with
t h e base zoning of t h e "R-S" d i s t r i c t , the schematic design had
been found by t h e City Council t o be c o n t r a r y to the r e t i r e m e n t s
of the H i s t o r i c D i s t r i c t .
38.

As of March 24, 1980, no working drawings had been

prepared for any of the p r o j e c t s by Mr. Babcock.
39.

After being so informed, p l a i n t i f f did not «fllMftyL Ms

have working drawings prepared or submit the same to tfa» City.
40.

The ordinance e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e

f,

R-2H" d i s t r i c t and

downzoning p a r t of t h e Avenues, including p l a i n t i f f ' s property
were published and took e f f e c t on March 28, 1980 after the
r e l e a s e of t h e r e s t r a i n i n g order.
IV.

Plan Review a t T r i a l .

41.

A subsequent review of a l l of the schematic or

conceptual drawings for the various p r o j e c t s and revisions
(Exhibits 37-P, 38-P, 39-P and 43-P)

^3&=^BBS^b^r^y-^B
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. *Th£ k^view of the proposed

projects revealed:
(a) Violations of the then existing "R-G" zoning ordinance
regarding required sideyards and rearyards, an unresolved
ownership conflict regarding an existing right of way; and the
undisclosed lack of ownership of one parcel,
(b) The necessity of obtaining variances from the Board of
Adjustment before zoning approval could have been given for any
of the projects due to setback, sideyards and other violations.
(c) While the above problems could be detected from the
preliminary drawings, the drawings submitted for each of the
proposed or revised projects were insufficient to conduct a
complete zoning review.
42.

Without regard to the requirements of the Historic

District related to design review, or to the change in zoning,
the various projects or revisions proposed did not meet the
minimum requirements of the "R-6n zoning district and the
projects could not have been approved by the City even on a
schematic basis.

The drawings for each project were otherwise

too preliminary and incomplete for full zoning review, and as
indicated in paragraph 41 above, and such drawings could not be
used to support zoning approval which is a prerequisite to the
issuance of a building permit.
43.

Before an application for a building permit could be

submitted to the Building Department and referred to the Planning
-10-
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pepartment

for zoning approval, and then be referred for review

approval by the remaining departments of the City, working
drawings would have to have been prepared setting forth detailed
information, including specifications, etc. for a specific
proposed project.

Said documents would have taken the architect

(according to his estimate) approximately a minimum of 3 months
to prepare.
44.

Plaintiff's architect knew the preliminary drawings

submitted to Landmark and the Commission for design review were
insufficient to support the application or the issuance of a
building permit.
45.

No application for a building permit from the City's

Building Department was ever applied for by the plaintiff.
46.

None of the four or various projects reflected in the

exhibits proposed by the plaintiff meets the minimum criteria for
multiple family dwellings under the new "R-2H" zoning ordinance.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The City has the power to zone and to create zoning

districts in order to promote the health, safety, morals,
convenience, order, prosperity and welfare of the inhabitants of
the city.

Legitimate objects of the City's power include zoning,

providing adequate light and air, classifying land uses, and the
preservation of buildings and structures of historical and
architectural significance, and the creation of historical
districts and landmark sites.
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of oqpction
5 1 - ->*<
3 2 - 1 ,t e t s e q^. , Revised
The p r o v •i s^i,o- ^
n cs or
e i n u n ->•

2.

0^inances_oi_SJ1^^

1965, as amended, e s t a b -

l i s h i n g h i s t o r i c d i s t r i c t s and landmark s i t e s c o n s t i t u t e a v a l i d
e x e r c i s e of t h e C i t y ' s power and the p r o v i s i o n s of said ordinance
are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v a l i d and e n f o r c e a b l e .
3.

s a i d h i s t o r i c d i s t r i c t ordinance, " S i t e s Ordinance-

r e q u i r e s a l l p r o p o s a l s for c o n s t r u c t i o n within a h i s t o r i c
d i s t r i c t or s i t e t o be submitted by a p p l i c a t i o n for design review
by the H i s t o r i c Landmark Committee, "Landmark".

Landmark

determines whether t h e proposed p r o j e c t i s v i s u a l l y compatible
with e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e s and adjacent b u i l d i n g s based upon
development standards adopted by the C i t y .
i s

Landmark's d e c i s i o n

forwarded as a recommendation to the Planning Commission.

The

Planning Commission then e v a l u a t e s the proposal in l i g h t of
Landmark's recommendation and e i t h e r d e n i e s or grants conceptual
approval t o t h e d e s i g n of t h e proposal.

Unless timely appealed

t h e Planning Commission's d e c i s i o n i s f i n a l .

If approved, the

proposed p r o j e c t i s then processed l i k e a l l other construction
projects.

A s e p a r a t e a p p l i c a t i o n for a building permit

accompanied by working drawings must be submitted t o the Building
a p a r t m e n t i n order to determine whether the p r o j e c t « . t s

zoning

ordinances and b u i l d i n g code requirements.
4

s p e c i f i c a l l y . Section 53-32-8,

S^l^^ity^JJtah,

Revised^rdinances_of

, 9 6 5 , as amended, pertaining to development

standards i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .

The term " v i s u a l l y compati b l e" as

-12-
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used within said section is not unconstitutionally vague.
5.

The provisions of Section 51-14A-1, et seq., Revised

Ordinances of Salt Lake Cityy Utah, 19 65, as amended, creating an
"R-2H" zoning district, constitute a valid exercise of the zoning
power of Salt Lake City Corporation.
6.

The provisions of the "R-2H" ordinance pertaining to

both the procedure for obtaining a conditional use in said
district, and the functions of the Landmark Committee and the
Board of Adjustment as set forth in Sections 51-14A-10, 11 and 13
are valid and constitutional.
7.

The City Council of Salt Lake City is the legislative

body of Salt Lake City.

The Planning and Z6ning Commission is a

subordinate and an advisory body to the City Council.

Decisions

rendered by the Planning and Zoning Commission are reviewable by
the City Council.
8.

:L

The Greater Avenues Community Council "GACC" constituted

a "person aggrieved"rby the Planning Commissionfs decision
approving the design of plaintiff's project and had the rigfct to
appeal the decision to the City Council.

The fact that the term

"Board of Commissioners" is found in Section 51-31-11, and that
the Commission form of government in Salt Lake City has been
replaced by a Council/Mayor form of government does not render
the provisions of said ordinance invalid.
9.

The City Council was a proper body to hear the appeal

from the decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission regarding
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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t h e proposed design of p l a i n t i f f ' s p r o j e c t withfn an h i s t o r i c
d i s t r i c t , based upon both i t s i n h e r e n t powers aad the delegation
of such power by t h e Mayor.
10.

The hearing and d e c i s i o n of the Council did not v i o l a t e

t h e separation of powers d o c t r i n e as set forth in the Optional
Forms of Government Act, S e c t i o n 10-3-1201, et seq. f Utah Code
Ann.

The d e c i s i o n of t h e Council denying design approval t o

p l a i n t i f f ' s p r o j e c t was w i t h i n the scope and po¥er of the Council
and was not a r b i t r a r y or c a p r i c i o u s .
11.

GACC was provided an a p p r o p r i a t e admimistrative forum

by the City r e g a r d i n g the a p p e a l .
(12.

The p l a i n t i f f has no vested r i g h t , ani i s not e n t i t l e d

to an order, p e r m i t t i n g the p l a i n t i f f to build tfie proposed
c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t involving 32-35 u n i t s of 6 s t o r i e s or 65-75 1
in h e i g h t .

The a c t i o n s of the p l a i n t i f f

in subsitting only'

schematic and p r e l i m i n a r y drawings t h a t failed sren to s a t i s i f y
b a s i c requirements for design approval at a tin® when a change of
zoning was pending before t h e City for the area in which
p l a i n t i f f ' s proposed p r o j e c t was l o c a t e d , did not c o n s t i t u t e
s u b s t a n t i a l compliance with the ordinances of Salt Lake City or
the laws of t h i s s t a t e , s u f f i c i e n t to vest plaintiff with t h e
j r i g h t for a b u i l d i n g p e r m i t .
13.

P l a i n t i f f ' s proposed preliminary conc^tual and

schematic drawings were incomplete, demonstrated v i o l a t i o n s of
e x i s t i n g zoning o r d i n a n c e s , and would have required zoning
.

.
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variances from the Board of Adjustment or changes.

Said projects

would have required both additional schematic and working
drawings and changes before a building permit for plaintiff's
project could have either been applied for or issued by the
City.

Thereforef the plaintiff's actions did not constitute

sufficient compliance with the ordinances of Salt Lake City or
the laws of this state in order to vest the plaintiff the right
to build any one of the proposed construction projects.
14.

That passage of five months after plaintiff submitted

his initial proposed project for design review did not require
the City to issue a building permit to the plaintiff pursuant to
the provisions of 51-37-7 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City;
and did not vest the plaintiff the right to build his first
proposed 35 unit project or any other subsequently proposed
project or revision in that:

The ordinance in effect at all

relevant times of this matter, required the City to issue a

~

building permit after the expiration of 5 months, only if the
proposed project "met all other requirements of City and State
law for issuance of such a [building] permit."

Plaintiff's

projects did not meet all requirements for the issuance of a
building permit.
15.

The submission of an application for design review by

the Landmark Committee does not constitute the submission of an
application for a building permit.
16. The action of the City Council in downzoning the East
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Central Avenues, as described in Ordinance #10 of 1980, to a
residential "R~2H" classification on an area including
plaintiff's property was valid.
17.

Salt Lake City did not have a compelling reason for

exercising its police power retroactively, had the plaintiff been
found entitled to proceed under the "R-6" zoning.
18.

Plaintiff's prayer for extraordinary relief should be

denied, and plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed with
prejudice.
f

DATED this

day of

s /

£^~&&c*

TTEST
DIXON H
Deputy Clsrk

•m,*.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of
the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the
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